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ABSTRACT
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from exer-
cising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. After decades of 
confusion, the Supreme Court recently clarified the scope and proper appli-
cation of the doctrine in two cases, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic In-
dustries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis. However, the Court left a key question 
unanswered: which state court “judgments” trigger the protection of Rook-
er-Feldman? Does the doctrine prohibit lower federal courts from reviewing 
only final state court judgments? Or does it also prohibit review of state 
court interlocutory orders, such as stays, preliminary injunctions, rulings 
on pretrial motions, and discovery orders? The circuits are split on this is-
sue. This Article examines the evolution and purpose of Rooker-Feldman
and concludes that the doctrine should protect all state court judgments, 
including interlocutory orders. This is the only approach that respects in-
terests vital to the interaction between state and federal courts, including 
separation of powers, federalism, and parity. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to hear appeals from final state court judgments.1 By comparison, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts can only exercise “orig-
inal jurisdiction,”2 not appellate jurisdiction.3 In Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co.4 and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,5
the Supreme Court interpreted these two statutes and held that  
lower federal courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state 
court judgments.6
 At first blush, this rule seems logical and straightforward. Over 
the years, however, an “impermeable cover of jurisprudential kudzu 
has grown” from this seemingly simple rule.7 Judges and scholars 
have heaped scathing criticism on the “so-called Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.”8 They argue that the doctrine is confusing,9 that it serves 
no useful purpose,10 and that it gets conflated with abstention and 
                                                                                                                    
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
3. See id.
4. 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
5. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  
6. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.  
7. Allison B. Jones, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Mean to Be 
Inextricably Intertwined?, 56 DUKE L.J. 643, 643 (2006).  
8. Indeed, the prevalent use of the phrase “so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine” itself 
suggests that many judges and scholars view the doctrine as questionable or illegitimate. 
See, e.g., Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 468 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennzoil Co. v. 
Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-
Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 188 n.3 (1st Cir. 2006); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 
1270, 1281 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1022 (2002). 
9. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 7, at 643. 
10. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Comment, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let 
State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1999) (“The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine is an oddity in the law. In fact, I have been unable to think of another legal doc-
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preclusion doctrines.11 Some even argue that the doctrine should be 
abolished outright.12 After the Supreme Court recently emphasized 
the narrowness of the doctrine,13 a few critics gleefully announced 
that Rooker-Feldman was finally dead.14
 Alas, to the annoyance of those intent on hauling Rooker-
Feldman off for burial, the corpse keeps shouting, “I am not dead 
yet!”15 Lower federal courts continue to use the doctrine as a “docket-
clearing workhorse.”16 During the year following the Supreme Court’s 
most recent Rooker-Feldman decision, lower federal courts invoked 
the doctrine more than 500 times and used it to bar federal jurisdic-
tion in approximately seventy percent of those cases.17 Despite the 
wishful thinking of the doctrine’s many detractors, these numbers 
highlight an inconvenient truth—the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 
alive and here to stay.18
                                                                                                                    
trine that lacks both a clear role and a clear justification.”); Gary Thompson, Note, The 
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts,
42 RUTGERS L. REV. 859, 861 (1990) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is unnecessary and 
potentially harmful.”). 
11. See, e.g., Rachel Thomas Rowley, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A Mere Super-
fluous Nuance or a Vital Civil Procedure Doctrine? An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s Deci-
sion in Johnson v. Rodrigues, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 321, 321 (2000) (“Rooker-Feldman is of-
ten misapplied as an abstention or preclusion doctrine and courts exacerbate the problem 
by continually using the three doctrines interchangeably.”). 
12. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground 
Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1999) (“Our conclusions may be summarized 
simply: Feldman itself should be overruled. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be ab-
olished.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 862 (calling for “the end to recognition of Rooker-
Feldman as an independent doctrine of federal court jurisdiction”). 
13. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
14. One commentator published a mock obituary for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
dating its death as February 21, 2006, the day of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lance v. 
Dennis. See Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D 317, 317 (2006). 
Speaking for the many detractors of “Mr. Feldman,” the obituary opined: “It is hoped that 
he leaves no survivors. Funeral services will be held in the National Cathedral on Friday, 
February 24, 2006, at 2:00 p.m.” Id. at 318. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens has 
proclaimed the death of Rooker-Feldman at least twice. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 
293, 318 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Lance, 546 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
15. The author confesses this is a not-so-subtle reference to Broadway’s Spamalot,
and, reaching farther back, to Monty Python and the Holy Grail.
16. Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Sta-
tus, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1999). 
17. A Westlaw search of all federal cases in which the word “Rooker” and “Feldman” 
appeared in the same sentence showed that between February 22, 2006, and February 22, 
2007—the year immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lance v. Dennis—
lower federal courts cited Rooker-Feldman in 682 decisions and addressed whether the 
doctrine was applicable in 524 of those decisions. Lower federal courts used Rooker-
Feldman to bar jurisdiction for at least some of the litigants’ claims in 381 cases, 
representing 72.7% of the cases in which the doctrine was analyzed.  
18. See, e.g., O’Callaghan v. Harvey, 233 F. App’x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2007); Chapman v. 
Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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 If we are stuck with Rooker-Feldman, we should at least under-
stand what it is and what role it plays. Unfortunately, this is not an 
easy task. Lower federal courts disagree on the doctrine’s scope and 
proper application19 and often confuse it with preclusion doctrines, 
especially res judicata.20 Given how frequently courts use Rooker-
Feldman to bar federal jurisdiction, it is surprising how muddled it is 
and how infrequently scholars analyze it.21
 The Supreme Court attempted to clarify Rooker-Feldman in two 
recent decisions—Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp.22 and Lance v. Dennis.23 In these cases, the Court held that the 
doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complain-
ing of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court re-
view and rejection of those judgments.”24 In other words, entry of a 
state court judgment triggers the doctrine. After the state court files 
its judgment, the losing party must appeal through the state court 
system and cannot attempt to overturn the judgment by filing a new 
lawsuit in federal district court. 
 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court left a key question unans-
wered: which state court “judgments” trigger the protection of Rook-
er-Feldman?25 Does the doctrine prohibit federal district courts from 
reviewing only final state court judgments? Or does it also prevent 
federal district courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over 
state court interlocutory decisions, such as stays, preliminary injunc-
tions, rulings on pretrial motions, and discovery orders? Federal cir-
                                                                                                                    
19. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1440 (5th ed. 2003) (“The lower courts, which have often found 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relevant and even dispositive, have not agreed on its proper 
scope or application.”); Adam McLain, Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a 
Workable Role, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1555, 1573 (2001) (“[C]ourts are confused and conse-
quently are misapplying the doctrine.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 880 (“Lower court in-
terpretations of Feldman have been mixed.”). 
20. See, e.g., Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (“[W]here a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state pro-
ceeding . . . , subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion.”), abrogated by Exxon Mo-
bil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 
271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (characterizing Rooker-Feldman as “a combination of the absten-
tion and res judicata doctrines”). 
21. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1175-76 (“Federal courts scholars and casebook au-
thors, most likely taking their cue from the Supreme Court’s lack of attention to the doc-
trine, have themselves given it little or no attention.”). 
22. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).  
23. 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam).  
24. Id. at 464; Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
25. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][c][ii]  
(3d ed. 2006); Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate 
Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 144 (2006) [hereinafter Sherry, Logic  
Without Experience].
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cuit courts are split on this question,26 and scholars have not ana-
lyzed the issue in depth.27 There is no resolution on this aspect of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, despite its importance.28
 This Article bridges that gap. Part II examines the evolution of 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rooker to its recent decisions in Exxon Mobil and Lance. This analy-
sis shows that the Supreme Court has clarified the scope of Rooker-
Feldman, but it has not addressed whether the doctrine applies only 
to final state court judgments or also to state court interlocutory or-
ders. We must look beyond existing case law for an answer. 
 Part III of this Article examines the purposes of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. The doctrine enforces separation of powers and 
the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, advances interests of fede-
ralism by protecting state court judgments, and advances interests of 
parity by recognizing that state courts are fully competent to adjudi-
cate federal claims. This portion of the Article concludes that courts 
should reason from these underlying principles when analyzing un-
answered questions about Rooker-Feldman.
 Part IV examines the current circuit split on whether the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars suits in federal district court that challenge 
state court interlocutory orders. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits use a narrow approach, applying Rooker-Feldman only to fi-
nal state court judgments. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and District of 
Columbia Circuits use a broad approach, extending Rooker-Feldman 
to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. The 
First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use an intermediate ap-
proach, applying Rooker-Feldman to some—but not all—state court 
interlocutory orders. 
                                                                                                                    
26. E.g., compare TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(emphasizing that Rooker-Feldman protects only final state court judgments), and Amos v. 
Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) (same), and 
FDIC v. Meyerland Co. (In re Meyerland Co.), 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (same), 
with Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (same), and Pieper 
v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Rooker-Feldman
to state court interlocutory orders), and Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 
1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same), and Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir.  
1996) (same). 
27. Recent scholarship offers only brief analysis on whether Rooker-Feldman extends 
to state court interlocutory orders post-Exxon Mobil. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Ed-
ward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at Last? Rooker-Feldman Anal-
ysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 21-23 
(2006), http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2006/fedctslrev1.pdf; Sherry, Logic Without 
Experience, supra note 25, at 144. 
28. With federal courts invoking Rooker-Feldman in more than 500 cases each year, 
supra note 17, any split in circuit authority on the doctrine’s scope has far-reaching conse-
quences for hundreds of litigants. 
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 Finally, Part V concludes that the Supreme Court should resolve 
this circuit split by adopting the broad approach, extending Rooker-
Feldman to state court interlocutory orders. The broad approach is 
the only rule that is consistent with the purposes of the doctrine. It 
keeps lower federal courts within the boundaries of their statutory 
jurisdiction, advances principles of federalism, and recognizes that 
state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims. By 
adopting this approach, the Supreme Court can ensure that Rooker-
Feldman reflects the limits of the statutory jurisdiction of federal 
courts. Under those statutes, lower federal courts lack appellate ju-
risdiction over state court judgments, including those judgments that 
are interlocutory in nature. 
II.   EVOLUTION OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arises from two cases decided sixty 
years apart, in which the Supreme Court held that federal district 
courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.29 Af-
ter more than twenty years of confusion in the lower federal courts,30
the Supreme Court clarified the doctrine’s scope in its recent deci-
sions in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.31 and 
Lance v. Dennis.32 However, these decisions fail to address whether 
the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or also pro-
tects state court interlocutory orders.33
A.   A Simple Rule Erects a Gate Against Jurisdiction: The Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Rooker
 The Supreme Court laid the cornerstone of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine in its 1923 decision in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.34 Dora 
and William Rooker owned real estate in Indiana.35 Financial  
embarrassment from the prohibitive cost of improvements to their 
property36 led the Rookers to deed their land to Fidelity Trust Com-
pany in exchange for a loan that they failed to repay.37 The result of 
                                                                                                                    
29. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); see also infra Parts II.A., Part II.B.  
30. See infra Part II.C. 
31. 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
32. 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra Part II.D. 
33. See infra Part II.E. 
34. 263 U.S. at 415-16.  
35. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769, 770 (Ind. 1921). 
36. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114, 115 (1923); Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 109 N.E. 766, 766 (Ind. 1915). 
37. Rooker, 131 N.E. at 771-72. Under the arrangement, Fidelity, as trustee, was to 
advance moneys for [the Rookers’] benefit, assist in procuring advances from 
others, protect the title, ultimately sell the land, use the proceeds in satisfying 
such mortgages or liens as might be superior to the rights of the trustee and in 
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this transaction was twenty-four years of litigation in state and fed-
eral courts.38
 After two rounds of litigation in Indiana state courts,39 the Rook-
ers filed an action in federal district court, seeking to have the state 
court judgment “declared null and void.”40 The Rookers argued that 
the state court decision violated the U.S. Constitution because it gave 
effect to an unconstitutional state law and contradicted prior state 
court rulings.41 The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction and 
dismissed the suit.42
 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the case.43 The Court held that federal district courts do 
not have appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.44 First, 
the Court drew a negative inference from its own statutory grant of 
appellate jurisdiction.45 Because the statute explicitly vests only the 
Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over final state court 
                                                                                                                    
repaying moneys advanced by it and by others, and turn the residue over to the 
wife, her personal representatives or assigns. 
Rooker, 261 U.S. at 115. 
38. See generally McLain, supra note 19, at 1560-63 (describing the factual and proce-
dural history of the Rooker litigation). The Rookers first filed suit in Indiana circuit court 
on October 30, 1912. See Rooker, 109 N.E. at 768. More than twenty-four years later, the 
final disposal in the litigation occurred when the Indiana Court of Appeals denied Dora 
Rooker’s appeal from a judgment striking her complaint from the files. See Rooker v. Fidel-
ity Trust Co., 5 N.E.2d 140, 140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1936) (en banc). 
39. The first round of state court litigation focused on whether the contract was a 
trust agreement or mortgage, with the Indiana Supreme Court ruling that a trust had 
been created. Rooker, 109 N.E. at 768-70. In the second round of state court litigation, the 
trial court applied the law of trusts, holding that Fidelity had “faithfully performed its du-
ties as trustee” and had a right to sell the property and distribute the proceeds according to 
the terms of the contract. Rooker, 131 N.E. at 773. After the Indiana Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court’s judgment, id. at 776, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the judg-
ment on writ of error, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, and dismissed the case. See
Rooker, 261 U.S. at 118. 
40. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923).  
41. Id. The Rookers argued that the Indiana state court judgment violated the Con-
tracts Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
See id.
42. See id. at 415. 
43. Id. (“[T]he suit is so plainly not within the District Court’s jurisdiction as defined 
by Congress that the motion to affirm must be sustained.”). 
44. Id. at 416.  
45. See id. At the time of the Rooker opinion, section 237 of the Judicial Code was the 
statutory basis for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over final state court judgments. See
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726 (1916) (“A final judgment or decree in 
any suit in the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, [impli-
cating a federal question,] may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme 
Court upon a writ of error.”); Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (citing Judicial Code, section 237, as 
amended Act. of Sept. 6, 1916). Today, the relevant grant of statutory jurisdiction formerly 
conveyed by section 237 of the Judicial Code is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). Gayle 
Gerson, Note, A Return to Practicality: Reforming the Fourth Cox Exception to the Final 
Judgment Rule Governing Supreme Court Certiorari Review of State Court Judgments, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 794-95 n.33 (2004). 
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judgments, federal district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over 
such judgments.46 Second, the Court drew another inference from the 
statutory grant of jurisdiction for federal district courts, which is 
“strictly original.”47 Because the statute conveys only original juris-
diction, district courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction.48 In oth-
er words, if Congress wanted federal district courts to have appellate 
jurisdiction over state court judgments, it would have said so. Con-
gress did not convey such jurisdiction, so no jurisdiction exists. 
 For sixty years, courts and commentators largely ignored the 
Rooker decision or conflated its simple rule with other doctrines.49
The Supreme Court cited the case only twice, both times while apply-
ing res judicata.50 Lower federal courts cited the rule from Rooker in-
frequently,51 and when they did, they often confused it with res judi-
cata52 or Younger abstention.53 The only significant academic article 
                                                                                                                    
46. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (“Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the 
United States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify 
[state court] judgment[s] . . . .”). 
47. Id. The Court based its premise of district court original jurisdiction on section 24 
of the Judicial Code. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911) (“The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows . . . .” (emphasis added)); Rooker,
263 U.S. at 416 (citing Judicial Code, section 24). Today, the relevant grant of statutory ju-
risdiction formerly conveyed by section 24 of the Judicial Code is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 (2006). See McLain, supra note 19, at 1563 (“[The Rooker] holding was based on infe-
rences drawn from the precursors to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257 and 1331, which grant jurisdiction 
to review certain state court judgments to the Supreme Court and original jurisdiction to 
federal district courts, respectively.”). In addition to § 1331, other statutory provisions also 
convey original jurisdiction to federal district courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S. § 1330(a) (2006) (ac-
tions against foreign states); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (diversity of citizenship); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333 (2006) (admiralty and maritime). 
48. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (“To [allow district courts to review state court judg-
ments] would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by the 
District Courts is strictly original.”). 
49. E.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1437 (Rooker was “largely forgotten” until 
1980); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1133 (“Rooker . . . for the most part lay dor-
mant for sixty years.”); Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1999) [hereinafter Sher-
ry, Judicial Federalism] (“For six decades, lower courts applied Rooker sporadically, often 
using it interchangeably with doctrines of preclusion—which were themselves in some dis-
array.”); McLain, supra note 19, at 1563 (noting that before the Feldman decision, “Rooker 
was not particularly influential, and it was cited infrequently over subsequent decades”). 
50. The Court cited Rooker in a decision holding that res judicata barred relitigation 
of a union’s collective bargaining agreement. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 
328 U.S. 275, 282-83 (1946). Justice White also cited Rooker in a case in which the peti-
tioner argued that res judicata precluded federal court review of a state court judgment. 
See Fla. State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960, 961 (1971) (White, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). Given this context, it is not surprising that lower federal courts 
conflated Rooker and res judicata. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1180 (“[Rooker] was cited 
sporadically in the following years, and was often mentioned interchangeably with  
res judicata.”). 
51. See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1133.  
52. See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Hutcherson v. 
Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Props.,  
Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (1st Cir. 
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to analyze the Rooker case during this period argued that the doc-
trine had a scope identical to res judicata.54
B.   Extending the Rooker Principle: The Supreme Court’s Decision  
in Feldman
 With little warning, the dormant Rooker doctrine erupted in 1983 
when the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals v. Feldman.55 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied 
two applications seeking waivers from a bar admission rule that 
made it difficult for graduates of unaccredited law schools to sit for 
the bar exam.56 The rejected applicants, Marc Feldman57 and Edward 
Hickey,58 each filed suit in federal district court, contending that the 
ruling by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals violated federal 
constitutional rights and antitrust laws.59 The district court dis-
                                                                                                                    
1972) (citing the rule from Rooker to support its holding that collateral estoppel bars appel-
lant’s claim). 
53. See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 251-53 (5th Cir. 1973) (invoking Rooker to 
support its holding that Younger abstention bars plaintiff’s federal action); Aristocrat 
Health Club of Hartford, Inc. v. Chaucer, 451 F. Supp. 210, 218-19 (D. Conn. 1978) (citing 
the rule from Rooker as one of several reasons for applying Younger abstention); Sole v. 
Grand Jurors, 393 F. Supp. 1322, 1331 n.17 (D.N.J. 1975); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (establishing abstention doctrine based on “the national policy forbid-
ding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under  
special circumstances”).  
54. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res 
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1341 (1980) (“Because any claim 
that the federal district courts would lack jurisdiction to hear under Rooker also would be 
barred by a previous judgment under principles of res judicata, the scope of claim preclu-
sion is identical under the two doctrines.”). 
55. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  
56. See id. at 464-72. The rule required applicants for the District of Columbia bar ex-
am to submit certificates verifying that they graduated from an accredited law school. Id.
at 464-65. Alternatively, an unaccredited law school graduate could sit for the bar exam 
“only after receiving credit for 24 semester hours of study in a law school that at the time 
of study was approved by the American Bar Association and with Committee approval.” Id.
at 465 n.1. 
57. Rather than attending law school, Feldman completed an alternative program of-
fered by the Commonwealth of Virginia in which he worked in an attorney’s office in Char-
lottesville, audited law classes at the University of Virginia, and served as a law clerk for a 
federal district court judge. Id. at 465. He passed the Virginia bar exam and began working 
as a staff attorney for a Baltimore legal aid bureau. Id. Although Maryland had a rule sim-
ilar to the one used by the District of Columbia, Feldman had obtained a waiver and 
passed the Maryland bar exam. Id.
58. Hickey attended unaccredited Potomac School of Law in Washington, D.C. after 
spending twenty years in the Navy. Id. at 470. While Hickey was a student, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals granted waivers of the bar exam rule to graduates of another 
unaccredited law school, leading him to believe that he too would receive a waiver. Id. Im-
mediately before Hickey graduated, however, the Court of Appeals announced that it 
would no longer grant such waivers. Id.
59. Id. at 467-69, 471-72. 
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missed both cases, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an 
order of the highest court of the District of Columbia.60
 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed the district court with regard to the constitutional claims.61
The circuit court acknowledged that “[r]eview of a final judgment of 
the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”62 However, it held that the federal dis-
trict court did have jurisdiction because the prior proceedings in the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals were not judicial in nature.63
The circuit court reasoned that Feldman and Hickey had merely peti-
tioned for waiver of an admission requirement—“[t]hey did not seek 
review by the Court of Appeals of the decision of any other body or 
individual; they did not request the court to invalidate any rule; nor 
did they ask for anything as a matter of right.”64
 The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding 
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
several of the federal claims.65 The Court initially stated that “the 
United States District Court is without authority to review final de-
terminations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial 
proceedings.”66 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, “[r]eview of such determina-
tions can be obtained only in this Court.”67 Next, the Court concluded 
that the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
were judicial in nature.68 Although court action on Feldman and 
Hickey’s initial petitions “did not assume the form commonly asso-
ciated with judicial proceedings,”69 it nonetheless “involved a ‘judicial 
                                                                                                                    
60. See id. at 470, 473. 
61. Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing and remand-
ing the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims). The D.C. Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of Feldman and Hickey’s antitrust claims. Id. at 1308. 
62. Id. at 1310. Interestingly, the circuit court did not cite the Rooker decision in its 
opinion, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Feldman cites Rooker only once as 
part of a string citation. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. The “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” la-
bel did not surface until three years later in a Second Circuit decision. See Texaco Inc. v. 
Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). The Supreme 
Court’s reversal of this decision gave Justice Scalia an opportunity to label the pairing as 
the “so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring).
63. Feldman, 661 F.2d at 1310. 
64. Id. at 1320. After concluding that the district court had jurisdiction, the circuit 
court also concluded that res judicata did not preclude the suit. Id. at 1319-20. 
65. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also denied Feldman and Hickey’s 
cross-petitions for certiorari as to the antitrust claims. Id. at 474 n.11. 
66. Id. at 476. Although the District of Columbia is not a state, its court of appeals is 
considered the equivalent of the highest court of a state for purposes of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s statutory jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (2006) (“For the purposes of this section, 
the term ‘highest court of a State’ includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.”). 
67. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).  
68. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479. 
69. Id. at 482.  
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inquiry’ in which the [District of Columbia Court of Appeals] was 
called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce ‘liabilities as they 
[stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already  
to exist.’ ”70
 The Court attempted to define circumstances in which a litigant 
improperly seeks review of a state court judgment.71 It held that dis-
trict courts “have subject-matter jurisdiction over general challenges
to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceed-
ings, which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a 
particular case.”72 However, the Court held that district courts lack 
jurisdiction “over challenges to state-court decisions, in particular 
cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges al-
lege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.”73 In other 
words, federal constitutional claims requiring review of a final state 
court decision in a particular case are “inextricably intertwined” with 
the state court judgment and may be appealed only to the U.S. Su-
preme Court.74
 Applying this test, the Supreme Court concluded that Feldman 
and Hickey’s due process and equal protection claims were “inextric-
ably intertwined” with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ de-
cisions.75 The district court did not have jurisdiction over these claims 
because they were as-applied challenges arising from the denial of 
the waiver petitions.76 However, the Supreme Court held that district 
court jurisdiction was proper for Feldman and Hickey’s general chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of the bar admission rule, because 
those claims did not require review of a judicial decision in a particu-
lar case.77
 The Feldman decision clarified and expanded the rule from Rook-
er. First, the Supreme Court confirmed that the principle from Rook-
er—that federal district courts cannot hear appeals from state court 
judgments—is a jurisdictional bar.78 Second, this jurisdictional rule 
                                                                                                                    
70. Id. at 479 (first alteration added) (quoting Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 
210, 226 (1908)). 
71. See id. at 482-86.  
72. Id. at 486 (emphasis added). 
73. Id. (emphasis added). 
74. Id. at 486-87. 
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 487. However, the Court “expressly [did] not reach the question of whether 
the doctrine of res judicata forecloses litigation on these elements of the complaints.” Id. at 
487-88. 
78. See id. at 482 (“[T]o the extent that Hickey and Feldman sought review in the Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of their petitions for waiver, 
the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints.”); see also Row-
ley, supra note 11, at 324 (explaining that Feldman “upheld the idea that Rooker was a 
doctrine grounded in jurisdictional theories”).  
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prohibits district courts from reviewing state court judicial decisions, 
but it does not prevent review of state court administrative or legisla-
tive rulings.79 Third, Feldman prevents district courts from hearing 
not only blatant appeals of state court decisions (as in Rooker), but 
also claims that a party raises for the first time in federal district 
court that are inextricably intertwined with prior state court judg-
ments.80 After Feldman, plaintiffs could no longer make an end run 
around Rooker merely by recasting an appeal as a “new” claim in fed-
eral district court.81
C.   Fleeting References and Widespread Confusion: Federal Courts 
Apply (and Misapply) the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
 The expanded Rooker-Feldman rule caused mass confusion in the 
lower federal courts.82 For more than two decades, the Supreme 
Court provided little guidance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.83 Two 
Supreme Court decisions were marginally helpful. In Johnson v. De 
Grandy,84 the Court narrowly characterized Rooker-Feldman and 
                                                                                                                    
79. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1182-83. 
80. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16; see also Rowley, supra note 11, at 325 (“By 
adding this additional inquiry, the Feldman court extended the Rooker doctrine from is-
sues that were actually decided by the state court proceedings, to also include claims that 
were not litigated in the state court, and are inextricably intertwined with the merits of 
the state court.”).
81. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 875 (“[I]f plaintiffs who lose in state court recast 
their claims in federal court under the guise of federal constitutional claims that were not 
raised or actually decided by the state court, Rooker and Feldman will nonetheless prec-
lude jurisdiction if the constitutional claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the merits 
of the state court judgment.”). 
82. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1183 (“Unfortunately, nothing in Feldman explains 
the rationale for the language [‘inextricably intertwined’] or gives any indication of its 
proper scope.”); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1136 (“Feldman muddied more wa-
ters than it cleared.”); Jones, supra note 7, at 651 (“After Feldman, district courts were left 
wondering how to apply its new standards—how to differentiate between general and par-
ticular challenges, and especially, how to identify when a claim is inextricably intertwined 
with a challenge to a state court judgment.”). 
83. Between its 1983 decision in Feldman and its 2005 decision in Exxon Mobil, the 
Supreme Court briefly mentioned the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in only six cases. See Veri-
zon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Johnson v. De 
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990); Mar-
tin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); ASARCO Inc. v. Ka-
dish, 490 U.S. 605, 622–23 (1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987); id. at 
18 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 28 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
84. 512 U.S. 997 (1994). Johnson involved a challenge to a Florida state legislative 
reapportionment plan. See id. at 1000-01. Plaintiffs argued that the legislative districts vi-
olated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by unlawfully diluting the voting strength of 
Hispanics and blacks. Id. at 1001-02; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). The Florida 
Supreme Court reviewed the plan, as required by the state constitution. See Johnson, 512 
U.S. at 1001. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court. Id. at 1000-02. The U.S. Supreme 
Court held, in part, that the Florida Supreme Court decision did not preclude the plaintiffs’ 
federal suit. See id. at 1004-05. 
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seemed to suggest that only parties to the underlying state court pro-
ceeding could invoke the doctrine in federal court.85 The Court also 
implied that the doctrine bars suits only if the federal plaintiff lost in 
state court and complained of an injury caused by the state court 
judgment itself, rather than a prior injury caused by an adverse par-
ty.86 Similarly, a footnote in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission of Maryland87 downplayed the role of the doctrine, stat-
ing that it “merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of orig-
inal jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise 
appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress 
has reserved to this Court.”88 The Court did note, however, that “[t]he 
doctrine has no application to judicial review of executive action, in-
cluding determinations made by a state administrative agency.”89 Al-
though these decisions used dicta to hint at Rooker-Feldman’s proper 
scope, they gave little guidance on how lower courts should apply  
the doctrine.90
 Despite the lack of Supreme Court elaboration, there was an “ex-
plosive growth” of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the lower federal 
                                                                                                                    
85. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006 (“[T]he invocation of Rooker/Feldman is just as in-
apt here, for unlike Rooker or Feldman, the United States was not a party in the state 
court.” (emphasis added)). 
86. See id. (“[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance 
would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on 
the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” 
(emphasis added)).  
87. 535 U.S. 635 (2002). Verizon involved litigation under the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, which required existing local-exchange carriers to share their networks with 
competitors by entering into interconnection agreements and reciprocal compensation 
agreements with new market entrants. See id. at 638. The Act required carriers to submit 
these agreements to a state utility commission for approval. Id. at 639. A dispute arose as 
to whether Internet Service Provider traffic was “local traffic” subject to an existing reci-
procal compensation agreement. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). WorldCom filed a 
complaint with the Public Service Commission of Maryland, which ruled against Verizon. 
Id. After unsuccessfully appealing the Commission’s order in state court, Verizon filed suit 
in federal district court, naming the Commission and WorldCom as defendants. Id. at 639-
40. The Court held in part that the Telecommunications Act did not divest the federal dis-
trict court of its jurisdiction to review the Commission’s determination. Id. at 641-42. 
88. Id. at 644 n.3. 
89. Id. The Court presumably was emphasizing a distinction made in the Feldman
decision, which held that Rooker-Feldman only bars federal court review of decisions ren-
dered in state court proceedings that are judicial in nature. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (“[T]he United States District Court is without  
authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
judicial proceedings.”). 
90. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1440 (“[T]he Supreme Court, which has ap-
plied the doctrine only twice (in the Rooker and Feldman cases themselves), has done vir-
tually nothing to give [lower federal courts] guidance.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-
Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 
(1999) (noting “the lack of focused Supreme Court attention since the Feldman decision  
in 1983”). 
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courts.91 Confusion was prevalent on many issues.92 Not surprisingly, 
courts disagreed on the meaning of the phrase “inextricably intert-
wined.”93 Some circuits conflated Rooker-Feldman with preclusion 
doctrines (especially res judicata),94 while others insisted that Rooker-
Feldman is a distinct and independent doctrine.95 Many courts con-
cluded that Rooker-Feldman applies only to litigants who were par-
ties to the prior state court proceedings,96 while other courts applied 
the doctrine to suits by nonparties.97 Although most circuits held that 
                                                                                                                    
91. See McLain, supra note 19, at 1573. 
92. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1440 (“The lower courts, which have often 
found the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relevant and even dispositive, have not agreed on its 
proper scope or application.”); McLain, supra note 19, at 1573 (“[C]ourts are confused and 
consequently are misapplying the doctrine.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 880 (“Lower 
court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.”). 
93. See Jones, supra note 7, at 643 (“Supreme Court opacity concerning what it means 
to be inextricably intertwined has resulted in significant incongruity in the lower federal 
courts . . . .” (citation omitted)).  
94. See, e.g., Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (“ ‘[I]nextricably intertwined’ means, at a minimum, that where a federal plain-
tiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding . . . , subsequent litigation 
of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under 
the principles of preclusion.”), abrogated by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
544 U.S. 280 (2005); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[O]ur Circuit has 
not allowed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar an action in federal court when that same 
action would be allowed in the state court of the rendering state.” (citing Gauthier v. Cont’l 
Diving Serv. Inc., 831 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 
274 (6th Cir. 1995) (characterizing Rooker-Feldman as “a combination of the abstention 
and res judicata doctrines”); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“[W]e have read Rooker not as a jurisdictional barrier but as an application of res judica-
ta.” (citing Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Hutcherson v. Leh-
tin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Francisco Enters., Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481, 485 
(9th Cir. 1973))), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).  
95. See, e.g., Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“[A]lthough the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of preclusion may be easily con-
fused with each other because they both define the respect one court owes to an earlier 
judgment, the two are not coextensive.” (citing GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 
726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993))); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We have 
consistently emphasized the distinction between res judicata and Rooker-Feldman and in-
sisted that the applicability of Rooker-Feldman be decided before considering res judica-
ta.”); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We note that 
Rooker-Feldman is broader than claim and issue preclusion because it does not depend on 
a final judgment on the merits.”). 
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), 226 F.3d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not be applied against non-parties.”); Bennett v. 
Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[S]ince the new plaintiffs were not parties 
to the state suit, their suit is not barred by the Rooker/Feldman doctrine.”); Owens, 54 
F.3d at 274 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to bar a suit in federal court 
brought by a party that was not a party in the preceding action in state court.” (citing Va-
lenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992))); Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 
1995) (“[T]he plaintiffs in this case are not, by the admission of all parties, parties to the 
circuit court action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to such circumstances.” 
(citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994))). 
97. See, e.g., Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478 (10th Cir. 2002), over-
ruling recognized by Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 n.10 (2006) (“Rooker-Feldman bars 
any suit that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether 
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Rooker-Feldman applies to lower state court judgments,98 they vigo-
rously debated whether the doctrine applies only to final state court 
judgments or whether it also protects interlocutory orders.99
 These divergent approaches demonstrate that two decades of 
near silence from the Supreme Court caused mass confusion regard-
ing Rooker-Feldman.100 Scholars begged the Court to weigh in on the 
doctrine, with the hope that it would clarify the scope and proper ap-
plication of the doctrine.101
                                                                                                                    
the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate her claims.” (citing Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. 
Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1986))); Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 
495 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[Lower federal] courts are simply without authority to review most 
state court judgments—regardless of who might request them to do so.” (citing Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at 
1112-23)); Garry, 82 F.3d at 1367 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[U]nder res judicata we must de-
termine whether the party against whom the defense is raised had a full and fair opportu-
nity to pursue its claim in the previous state proceeding. . . . Rooker-Feldman does not con-
tain analogous limitations.” (citation omitted)). 
98. See, e.g., Gisslen v. City of Crystal, 345 F.3d 624, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The 
[Rooker-Feldman] doctrine does not apply exclusively to decisions from a state’s highest 
appellate court of right, but also applies with equal force to decisions from a state trial 
court.”); Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e do not be-
lieve that lower federal courts should be prohibited from reviewing judgments of a state’s 
highest court but should somehow have free rein to review the judgments of lower state 
courts.”); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir. 1988) (using Rooker-Feldman 
to dismiss federal suit challenging state trial court judgment and noting that an “[a]ppeal 
in the state courts is the proper channel through which [plaintiff] was entitled to seek re-
lief”); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal 
Courts’ Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 141-42 
(1998) (“Although it could be argued that Rooker-Feldman only bars federal court action as 
to decisions that have been ruled upon by a state’s highest court, courts and commentators 
have generally applied Rooker-Feldman to decisions by lower state courts as well.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
99. E.g., compare Pieper, 336 F.3d at 462 (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 
federal district courts from reviewing state court interlocutory orders), and Brown & Root, 
Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), and Campbell v. Greisberg-
er, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), with Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (holding that interlocutory state court judgment lacking finality does not trigger 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine), and H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 612-13 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (same); see also Sternlight, supra note 98, at 142 (“[I]t is not entirely clear 
whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to final judgments, or also to interlocu-
tory rulings.”). 
100. See Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 958 n.55 (2006) (“[S]ince the [Supreme] Court had almost 
nothing to say about [Rooker-Feldman] from 1983 to 2005, the courts had ample room to 
improvise.”). Indeed, in a classic example of the strange “improvisation” by lower federal 
courts, at one point the Eighth Circuit mistakenly confused Rooker-Feldman with the Erie
doctrine and refused to apply state law in a diversity case. See Sherry, Judicial Federal-
ism, supra note 49, at 1088 n.17 (citing First Commercial Trust Co. v. Colt’s Mfg., 77 F.3d 
1081 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
101. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 90, at 1084 (“[T]he proliferation of lower court case law 
with many different emphases and some highly questionable decisions suggests that the 
time may be nigh for the Supreme Court to take an opportunity to clarify the doctrine.” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
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D.   Clarification of a Narrow Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Recent 
Decisions in Exxon Mobil and Lance
 The Supreme Court finally stepped in to clarify the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine in its 2005 decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi 
Basic Industries Corp.102 In July 2000, Saudi Basic Industries Corpo-
ration (SABIC) sued two ExxonMobil subsidiaries in Delaware state 
court, seeking declaratory relief in a royalties dispute.103 Two weeks 
later, ExxonMobil and its subsidiaries countersued SABIC in federal 
district court.104 In March 2003, a jury rendered a verdict in the state 
suit in favor of ExxonMobil’s subsidiaries.105 At the time of the state 
trial court judgment, the parallel federal suit was on appeal before 
the Third Circuit.106 The Third Circuit held that the suit was a “ ‘pa-
radigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal dis-
trict court from proceeding’ ” because the federal and state claims 
were identical.107 The Third Circuit also concluded that it was irrele-
vant that the federal suit had been filed before entry of the state 
court judgment.108
 The Supreme Court reversed.109 The Court made several observa-
tions in an attempt to clear up confusion in the lower federal 
courts.110 It initially stated that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doc-
trine, “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining 
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the dis-
                                                                                                                    
102. 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
103. Id. at 289. Two ExxonMobil subsidiaries had formed joint ventures in 1980 with 
SABIC to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. Id. (citing Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Ex-
xonMobil Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (D.N.J. 2002)). The dispute focused on SABIC’s 
royalties for sublicenses for a polyethylene manufacturing method. Id. (citing Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
104. Id.
105. See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 10-11 
(Del. 2005). In January 2005, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict. Id.
at 40. 
106. Exxon Mobil, 364 F.3d at 102-03 (Third Circuit decision submitted on March 24, 
2004); Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (district court judgment rendered 
on April 3, 2002); Mobil Yanbu, 866 A.2d at 11 (state trial court jury verdict returned on 
March 21, 2003). 
107. Exxon Mobil, 364 F.3d at 104 (quoting E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1090-91 
(3d Cir. 1997)). 
108. See id. at 104-05. The Third Circuit stated that “[t]he only timing relevant is 
whether the state judgment precedes a federal judgment on the same claims.” Id. at 105. 
The court expressed its concern about the policy effects of a ruling to the contrary—if it 
held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply to federal actions filed prior to the state court’s fi-
nal judgment, it “would be encouraging parties to maintain federal actions as ‘insurance 
policies’ while their state court claims were pending.” Id.
109. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 294. 
110. See id. at 291 (“We granted certiorari to resolve conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals over the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (citation omitted)); Rowe & 
Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 3 (“Sweeping extensions and conflicting interpretations of 
Rooker-Feldman finally led to a clarifying Supreme Court decision last year in Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.”). 
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trict court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review 
and rejection of those judgments.”111 The doctrine does not bar juris-
diction if the federal plaintiff presents “some independent claim.”112
The Court also stated that the Rooker-Feldman analysis is separate 
from preclusion and abstention doctrines.113 Finally—and most rele-
vant to the facts of Exxon Mobil—“[w]hen there is parallel state and 
federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the en-
try of judgment in state court.”114 Parallel state and federal suits are 
governed by preclusion law, not Rooker-Feldman.115 Applying these 
principles, the Court noted that ExxonMobil filed suit in federal dis-
trict court “well before any judgment in state court.”116 Thus, the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction af-
ter ExxonMobil prevailed in the Delaware courts.”117
 The following year, in Lance v. Dennis, the Supreme Court once 
again emphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine.118 In May 2003, Colorado’s attorney general filed suit in state 
court challenging the General Assembly’s congressional redistricting 
plan.119 After the General Assembly intervened as a defendant, the 
Colorado Supreme Court struck down the plan on state constitutional 
grounds.120 Several Colorado citizens who were unhappy with the 
state court judgment then filed suit in federal district court.121 The 
district court held that Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiffs’ federal 
                                                                                                                    
 111. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. 
112. Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 
1993)). An independent federal claim will foreclose application of the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine even if it “denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached.” Id. (quoting 
GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 728). 
113. See id. at 284. 
114. Id. at 292. The Court’s rationale recognizes that a more expansive reading of the 
scope of Rooker-Feldman would infringe on the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. See id. (“[N]either Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked 
concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related 
question while the case remains sub judice in a federal court.”). 
115. See id. at 293. 
116. Id.
117. Id. at 294. The Supreme Court also rejected the policy rationale behind the Third 
Circuit’s decision. See id. at 294 n.9 (“The Court of Appeals criticized ExxonMobil for  
pursuing its federal suit as an ‘insurance policy’ against an adverse result in state court. 
There is nothing necessarily inappropriate, however, about filing a protective action.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
118. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam). 
119. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1227 (Colo. 2003). 
120. See id. at 1243. The Colorado Supreme Court struck down the General Assembly’s 
redistricting plan after concluding that Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution 
limited redistricting to once every ten years. Id. at 1242-43. 
121. Lance, 546 U.S. at 461. The federal plaintiffs alleged that the Colorado Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Article V, Section 44 of the Colorado Constitution violated the 
Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
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suit.122 Applying Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court stated 
that Rooker-Feldman can bar suit when the federal plaintiff was a 
party in the state court proceedings or stands in privity with the 
state court loser.123 Although the federal plaintiffs had not been par-
ties to the state court suit, the court held that they stood in privity 
with the General Assembly because redistricting is a “matter of pub-
lic concern.”124
 The Supreme Court disagreed, vacating the district court’s judg-
ment.125 As in Exxon Mobil, the Court initially emphasized the nar-
rowness of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.126 It then emphasized that 
Rooker-Feldman is independent from preclusion law.127 Rejecting the 
Tenth Circuit’s privity analysis, the Court stated that “[t]he Rooker-
Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier 
state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, 
they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.”128
The doctrine did not apply in Lance because “plaintiffs were plainly 
not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding.”129
 Thus, Exxon Mobil and Lance clarified several aspects of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. First, the Rooker-Feldman analysis is 
completely separate from preclusion law and the abstention doc-
trines.130 In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized in Lance that 
“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.”131 Sec-
ond, the doctrine applies only if the federal suit is filed after the state 
court renders its judgment.132 In other words, Rooker-Feldman does 
not bar federal suits that a party files while state court proceedings 
                                                                                                                    
122. Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (D. Colo. 2005), vacated, Lance,
546 U.S. at 467. 
123. See id. (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has permitted the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine to be 
used against parties who were in privity with parties to the original state-court suit.” (cit-
ing Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 481 (10th Cir. 2002), partial overruling 
recognized by Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 n.10 (10th Cir. 2006))). 
124. See id. at 1125. 
125. Lance, 546 U.S. at 462-63. The Supreme Court reviewed the case under the statu-
tory provision allowing direct appeals from decisions of three-judge district court panels. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006); Lance, 546 U.S. at 462-63. 
126. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (“Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a rationale 
for a wide-reaching bar on the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and our cases since 
Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.” (citing 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005); Verizon Md., Inc. 
v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994))). 
127. Id. at 466. 
128. Id. (footnote omitted). 
129. Id. at 465. 
130. See id. at 466; Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see also Rowe & Baskauskas, supra 
note 27, at 17 (noting that federal courts should avoid “general resort to preclusion law 
even as an aid in determining applicability of Rooker-Feldman”). 
131. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 466. 
132. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see id. at 293. 
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are still ongoing.133 Finally, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable when the 
federal plaintiff was not a party to the state suit.134 After Lance, priv-
ity is not enough in most cases.135
E.   The Supreme Court Has Not Addressed Whether Rooker-Feldman
Protects State Court Interlocutory Orders 
 Even though Exxon Mobil and Lance clarified the scope of Rook-
er-Feldman, the Supreme Court did not specify which state court 
“judgments” trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.136 In particular, 
the Court did not address whether the doctrine applies only to final 
state court judgments or also protects state court interlocutory or-
ders.137 There is no doubt that Rooker-Feldman bars a federal district 
court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over a final state court 
judgment on the merits.138 But does Rooker-Feldman also prevent 
federal district courts from reviewing stays, preliminary injunctions, 
rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders, and other interlocutory 
decisions rendered by state courts? 
 There is no easy answer. None of the Supreme Court’s Rooker-
Feldman decisions involve an attempt by a federal district court to 
review a state court interlocutory order. One can interpret isolated 
dicta from the Court’s opinions either way. The Feldman decision re-
                                                                                                                    
133. See id. at 293-94. 
134. Lance, 546 U.S. at 465. 
135. Id. at 466. The Supreme Court qualified its holding in Lance, stating that “we 
need not address whether there are any circumstances, however limited, in which Rooker-
Feldman may be applied against a party not named in an earlier state proceeding,” and it 
gave the example of an estate taking a de facto appeal in district court from an earlier 
state court decision involving a decedent. Id. at 466 n.2. 
136. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 21-23; Sherry, Logic Without Expe-
rience, supra note 25, at 144. 
137. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is also worth noting that after 
Exxon Mobil and Lance, the role of the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry is uncertain as 
well. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 3-4. Although Exxon Mobil mentioned the 
language “inextricably intertwined” while giving background on the Feldman decision, see
544 U.S. at 286 & n.1, it played no role in the Court’s holding, id. at 293-94. Lance men-
tioned the phrase “inextricably intertwined” only while describing the flawed rationale of 
the district court in that case. 546 U.S. at 462-63. Scholars disagree on whether the “inex-
tricably intertwined” inquiry remains a meaningful part of the Rooker-Feldman analysis. 
Compare Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 121 (“The Court [in Exxon 
Mobil] appeared to abandon the ‘inextricably intertwined’ part of the doctrine.”), with 
Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 11-12 (suggesting that the “inextricably intert-
wined” concept occupies a secondary role in the Rooker-Feldman analysis, but noting that 
“we do not think it appropriate to conclude that the phrase can be entirely discarded”). 
138. The Rooker decision itself confirms this. In Rooker, the federal suit challenged a 
final state court judgment on the merits—the Indiana Supreme Court had previously af-
firmed the state trial court’s judgment that the trustee had a right to sell the Rookers’ 
property and distribute the proceeds under the terms of the contract. See Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923) (holding federal district court had no jurisdiction to 
review Indiana Supreme Court’s judgment); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769, 
773, 776 (Ind. 1921) (affirming trial court’s decision on the merits). 
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fers to the doctrine as a bar against federal district court review of 
“final” state court decisions.139 However, other language casts Rooker-
Feldman as a more expansive prohibition against lower federal court 
review of state court “judgments.”140
 Contradictory language in Exxon Mobil exacerbates this problem. 
In the first part of its opinion, the Court holds that Rooker-Feldman
bars federal suits filed “by state-court losers complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced.”141 Under this language, the doctrine con-
ceivably protects interlocutory orders that a state court enters before 
the commencement of a similar federal action.142 However, Exxon 
Mobil later states that the Rooker and Feldman cases exhibit the li-
mited circumstances in which the doctrine bars jurisdiction—“[i]n 
both cases, the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court 
after the state proceedings ended.”143 This language suggests that 
Rooker-Feldman may protect only final state court judgments.144
 Given the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s language, it 
would be a mistake to overread Exxon Mobil as restricting Rooker-
Feldman to final state court decisions.145 The Court did not define 
when state court proceedings have “ended” for purposes of the Rook-
er-Feldman doctrine,146 and the distinction between final and interlo-
cutory state court orders was not at issue in the case.147 Indeed, the 
decision itself notes that ExxonMobil filed suit in federal district 
court “well before any judgment in state court.”148 Exxon Mobil simply 
                                                                                                                    
139. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (“The District of 
Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without 
authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
judicial proceedings.” (emphasis added)). 
140. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 
(2002) (noting that Rooker-Feldman “does not authorize district courts to exercise appel-
late jurisdiction over state-court judgments” (emphasis added)); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 
U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (noting that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a party losing 
in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the 
state judgment in a United States district court” (emphasis added)); Rooker, 263 U.S. at 
415 (“If the [state court] decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but 
merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate pro-
ceeding.” (emphasis added)). 
141. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added). 
142. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (noting that “[a] state-court ‘judg-
ment’ might be construed to include the likes of a grant of a preliminary injunction, which 
could be viewed as a non-final judgment”). 
143. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added). 
144. Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22. 
145. Id. at 22-23. 
146. See Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 144. 
147. Instead, the Court analyzed a fact pattern in which a state trial court judgment 
was issued after the commencement of a suit in federal district court. See Exxon Mobil, 544 
U.S. at 289. 
148. Id. at 293 (emphasis added). 
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holds that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when a litigant files suit 
in federal court before the state court enters a judgment.149 It does not 
address whether the doctrine bars federal suits filed after entry of 
state court interlocutory orders. 
 In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally holds that federal 
district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state court judg-
ments. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Exxon Mobil and Lance
provide clarification to some questions relating to the scope of the 
doctrine. However, these decisions fail to indicate which state court 
“judgments” trigger Rooker-Feldman, and the Court has not ad-
dressed whether the doctrine applies only to final state court judg-
ments or also protects state court interlocutory orders. We must turn 
elsewhere for an answer. 
III.   PURPOSE OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
 Given the lack of clarity in existing case law, the best way to dis-
cern whether Rooker-Feldman protects state court interlocutory or-
ders is to reason from the principles underlying the doctrine itself.150
There are three fundamental principles behind Rooker-Feldman.151
First, the doctrine enforces constitutional separation of powers and 
the limited jurisdiction of federal courts.152 Second, Rooker-Feldman
advances interests of federalism by protecting state court judg-
ments.153 Third, the doctrine recognizes that state courts are fully 
competent to adjudicate federal claims.154
A.   Rooker-Feldman Enforces Separation of Powers and the Limited 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts 
 Courts have recognized that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 
rooted in the principle of separation of powers.”155 Congress has ex-
                                                                                                                    
149. Id.
150. Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (“Arguing from [Exxon Mobil’s] fine lin-
guistic differences, . . . does not seem . . . to be a fruitful exercise. It makes sense instead to 
start from a foundational principle undergirding Rooker-Feldman: the only federal court to 
which Congress has given any statutory authority to review state-court judgments is the 
Supreme Court.” (footnotes omitted)). 
151. This analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. Commentators have cited other wor-
thy purposes behind Rooker-Feldman. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 54, at 1350 (noting that 
Rooker-Feldman protects “finality in the judicial system”); George L. Proctor et al., Rooker-
Feldman and the Jurisdictional Quandary, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 113, 114 (2000) (recogniz-
ing that the doctrine “protect[s] the integrity of state court judgments”); Sherry, Judicial 
Federalism, supra note 49, at 1117 (arguing that the doctrine is a “forum-shifting device”). 
By examining the primary purposes behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Article aims 
to contribute significantly to existing literature on the subject. 
152. See infra Part III.A. 
153. See infra Part III.B. 
154. See infra Part III.C. 
155. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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clusive authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts,156 and those courts cannot hear a case unless Congress has af-
firmatively granted jurisdiction by statute.157 This principle has been 
the driving force behind Rooker-Feldman since the Rooker decision 
itself.158 The doctrine ensures that federal courts stay within the 
boundaries of their limited statutory jurisdiction.159
 It is important to stress the statutory nature of Rooker-Feldman.
Congressional legislation granting federal district courts appellate 
jurisdiction over state court judgments almost certainly would be 
within the constitutional limitations of Article III. When Alexander 
Hamilton discussed the constitutional limitations of federal judicial 
power in The Federalist, he perceived “no impediment to the estab-
lishment of an appeal from the state courts to the subordinate  
national tribunals.”160 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits cite this language 
as evidence that Rooker-Feldman is a statutory limitation, rather 
than a constitutional requirement.161 In other words, Congress  
could pass a statute granting lower federal courts appellate jurisdic-
tion over state court judgments, which would abolish the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 
 But Congress has not done so. Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 
created lower federal courts and defined their jurisdiction, “they were 
not given any power to review directly cases from state courts, and 
they have not been given such powers since that time.”162 The lan-
guage of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 is clear: only the U.S. Supreme Court may 
review state court judgments.163 The grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                    
156. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 
U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850); Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189. 
157. Robert B. Funkhouser et al., Comment, Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Though-
ts on the Limits of Federal Court Power over State Court Proceedings, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
767, 774 (1986). 
158. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (“Under the legislation 
of Congress, no court of the United States other than this Court could entertain a proceed-
ing to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that character. . . . The jurisdiction pos-
sessed by the District Courts is strictly original.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
159. See Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 (“The federal district courts, as courts of limited 
jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction which Congress determines is appropriate. Con-
gress has yet to give the lower federal courts jurisdiction to review state court judgments.” 
(citation omitted)); Rebecca Schmucker, Possible Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doc-
trine to State Agency Decisions: The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Van Harken v. City of 
Chicago, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 333, 333 (1997) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
is an extension of the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . .”). 
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). 
161. See Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006); In re 
Meyerland Co., 910 F.2d 1257, 1261 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990). 
162. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). 
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest 
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335 
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§ 1331 is equally clear: federal district courts can only exercise “orig-
inal jurisdiction,” not appellate jurisdiction.164
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine keeps lower federal courts from 
straying outside these statutory boundaries. Because the Constitu-
tion gives Congress the exclusive power to expand federal court juris-
diction, it would be wholly inappropriate for courts to do so on their 
own initiative.165 As Professor Williamson Chang argues, “[s]uch a de-
licate issue of fundamental federal-state relations must be left to a 
representative forum, such as Congress, where the justifications for 
state judicial sovereignty can be fully represented.”166 Entrusting 
Congress with decisions regarding federal court jurisdiction is not on-
ly a good idea—it is constitutionally mandated.167 Thus, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine enforces separation of powers and recognizes that 
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 
B.   Rooker-Feldman Preserves Federalism by Preventing Lower 
Federal Courts from Reviewing State Court Judgments 
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is also based on principles of fede-
ralism.168 Loosely defined, “federalism” is a system which divides so-
vereignty between two or more political units, each of which governs 
                                                                                                                    
(“Because Congress gave only the Supreme Court the explicit right to review the decisions 
of a state court, Congress meant to deny all other federal courts that power.”). 
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (em-
phasis added)); see also Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“Congress has empowered the federal district courts to exercise only original jurisdiction.” 
(quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000))); McLain, 
supra note 19, at 1572 n.111 (“If a district court lacks appellate jurisdiction under § 
1331 . . . , then clearly it cannot hear ‘appeals’ from lower state courts.”). But see Beer-
mann, supra note 10, at 1229 (arguing that Rooker-Feldman misinterprets § 1331, which is 
“permissive, not restrictive” and that “[s]ection 1331’s use of the word ‘original’ should be 
understood merely to direct plaintiffs to the proper court to file their cases”). 
165. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189 (“Congress has the responsibility for de-
termining the precise contours of federal jurisdiction and Rooker-Feldman is premised on 
the notion that Congress has defined those contours, through 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and § 1331, 
to preclude lower federal courts from hearing appeals from state court decisions.” (footnote 
omitted)); Chang, supra note 54, at 1376 (“Just as the lower federal courts may not on their 
own enlarge their jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may not, without congressional permis-
sion, share its exclusive jurisdiction with the lower courts.” (citation omitted)). 
166. Chang, supra note 54, at 1376. 
167. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 7-9 (describing the “Madisonian Compro-
mise,” in which the Constitutional Convention agreed that Congress would have the power 
to create lower federal courts). 
168. See, e.g., Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th 
Cir. 1997)); Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198; Chang, supra note 54, at 1341; Schmuck-
er, supra note 159, at 336; Benjamin Smith, Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a 
Crude Analysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 627, 636 (1987); Blake A. Snider, Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Ignores Prin-
ciples of Federalism and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (en banc), 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 881, 893 (1998). 
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the same populace.169 As Justice Anthony Kennedy notes, the Fra-
mers of the U.S. Constitution “split the atom of sovereignty” by creat-
ing a system in which “our citizens would have two political capaci-
ties, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the 
other.”170 In other words, the basis for the concept of federalism is the 
coexistence of two sovereign entities and the competing concerns of 
state and federal power. 
 The derivative concept of judicial federalism recognizes the inde-
pendence and sovereignty of the state and federal court systems.171
State and federal courts are separate legal systems that proceed in-
dependently of each other, with ultimate review in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.172 As one federal circuit court bluntly stated, “[j]udicial errors 
committed in state courts are for correction in the state court sys-
tems, at the head of which stands the United States Supreme Court; 
such errors are no business of ours.”173 State courts have a long tradi-
tion of jealously guarding their independence.174
 Assertion of jurisdiction and entry of judgment by a court are ex-
ercises of sovereign power,175 and tension arises when lower federal 
courts intrude upon the sovereignty and independence of state 
courts. This tension is inevitable to some extent because state and 
federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over many claims.176
                                                                                                                    
169. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 
(1964) (“A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and 
people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) 
there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the auton-
omy of each government in its own sphere.”). 
170. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,  
J., concurring). 
171. See, e.g., Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at 1085 (“Judicial federalism 
is the aggregation of issues arising from the existence of two sets of American courts, state 
and federal.”). 
172. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). 
173. Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1986). 
174. Professor Chang makes this observation: 
Today, when refiling a claim in federal court may be almost an automatic re-
sponse to an unsatisfactory state court result, it is easy to forget how reluctant-
ly the states acquiesced to any federal review of state court judgments. The 
power of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions, first challenged in 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, has been attacked repeatedly. 
Chang, supra note 54, at 1345 (footnotes omitted). 
175. Id. at 1375 (“The effect of allowing the lower federal courts to act as the appellate 
courts of the state not only contravenes the statutory grants of jurisdiction to the federal 
courts but undermines state judicial sovereignty.”). 
176. For example, federal courts can entertain state-law claims when the parties are 
citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (allowing federal district courts to 
exercise diversity jurisdiction); see also James William Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Di-
versity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1964) (“The tradi-
tional view is that diversity jurisdiction was established to provide a forum for the deter-
mination of controversies between citizens of different states which would be free from lo-
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However, our dual judicial system would cease to function “if state 
and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a par-
ticular case.”177 Congress was well aware of this inherent tension, and 
it passed jurisdictional statutes establishing “lines of demarcation 
between the two systems.”178
 Rooker-Feldman enforces one of these lines of demarcation. The 
doctrine preserves the delicate balance of judicial federalism by pre-
venting lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.179
Rooker-Feldman “ensures that the federal and state systems remain 
sovereign, with the Supreme Court the sole federal court with the 
power to rule on federal questions raised in either forum.”180 Thus, at 
its core the doctrine is “an obligatory, statutorily-based expression of 
federalism”181 that recognizes the “competing concerns of state judi-
cial sovereignty and federal power.”182
C.   Rooker-Feldman Recognizes that State Courts Are  
Fully Competent to Adjudicate Federal Claims 
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also acknowledges that state courts 
are just as capable of deciding federal claims as federal courts.183
Scholars often describe this concept as “parity” between state and 
federal courts.184 Several Supreme Court cases—including Feldman
itself—emphasize that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate 
                                                                                                                    
cal prejudice or influence.”). State courts also are fully competent to adjudicate federal 
claims. See infra Part III.C. 
177. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286. 
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“Rooker-Feldman . . . preserves a fundamental tenet in our system of federalism that . . . 
appellate review of state court decisions occurs first within the state appellate system and 
then in the United States Supreme Court.” (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th 
Cir. 1997))); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Rook-
er-Feldman is one of a number of doctrines that safeguards our dual system of government 
from federal judicial erosion.” (citing Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286)). 
180. Bandes, supra note 16, at 1184 (citing David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neg-
lected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 323 (1978)). 
 181. Chang, supra note 54, at 1341 (citations omitted). 
182. Id. at 1337.  
183. See, e.g., id. at 1366; Schmucker, supra note 159, at 336; Smith, supra note 168, at 
636. But see Bandes, supra note 16, at 1187 (stating that “Rooker-Feldman conflicts with 
other jurisdictional mandates . . . which reflect a congressional judgment that state court 
vehicles for the vindication of federal rights and interests are inadequate.” (footnote omitted)). 
184. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 322-26 (discussing the parity of 
state and federal courts and citing empirical studies and academic literature on the topic); 
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal  
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 233 n.1 (1988) (defining parity as “whether, overall, state 
courts are equal to federal courts in their ability and willingness to protect federal consti-
tutional rights”). 
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federal constitutional issues.185 In Stone v. Powell,186 the Court noted 
that “[s]tate courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obliga-
tion to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.”187
Endorsing the concept of parity, the Court said it was “unwilling to 
assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity 
to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the  
several States.”188
 Proponents of expansive federal court jurisdiction contest this as-
sumption and argue that state courts underenforce federal rights.189
Professor Burt Neuborne advances three reasons why federal courts 
generally are more sympathetic to federal claims.190 First, the federal 
judiciary supposedly attracts judges with greater technical compe-
tence because the position is better paid and more prestigious.191
Second, “[a]s heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement, feder-
al judges feel subtle, yet nonetheless real pressures to uphold that 
tradition.”192 Third, the life tenure of federal judges insulates them 
from “majoritarian pressures,” allowing them “to enforce the Consti-
tution without fear of reprisal.”193
 Advocates of parity respond with two arguments. First, the struc-
ture of Article III suggests that parity is an indispensable concept in 
our federal system, if not constitutionally mandated.194 The Constitu-
tion gave Congress complete discretion to establish (or not establish) 
lower federal courts.195 From this premise, scholars have argued that 
                                                                                                                    
185. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988) (“[W]hen a 
state proceeding presents a federal issue, . . . the proper course is to seek resolution of that 
issue by the state court.”); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (rejecting the 
“assumption that the States cannot be trusted to enforce federal rights with adequate dili-
gence” as “inappropriate” (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976))); D.C. 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983) (“We have noted the compe-
tence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims.” (citing Sumner v. Mata, 
449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Swain v. Pressley, 430 
U.S. 372, 383 (1977))). 
186. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
187. Id. at 494 n.35 (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,  
341-44 (1816)). 
188. Id.
189. Chemerinsky, supra note 184, at 233-34 (citations omitted). 
190. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1121-28 (1977); 
see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 323-24 (summarizing Neuborne’s analysis). 
191. See Neuborne, supra note 190, at 1121-22. 
192. Id. at 1124. 
193. Id. at 1127 (citation omitted). 
194. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 325-26. 
195. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may 
withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. 
Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”); see al-
so FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 160, at 401 (concluding “that the 
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“[s]ince Congress need not create any lower federal courts at all, Ar-
ticle III must be indifferent whether adjudication occurs in state or 
federal court.”196 Thus, the Constitution seems to assume that parity 
exists between state and federal courts on matters of federal law.197
Second, several empirical studies suggest that there is no meaningful 
difference between state and federal courts when it comes to the ad-
judication of federal claims.198
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine relies heavily on the concept of par-
ity. By prohibiting lower federal court interference with state court 
judgments, the doctrine assumes that state courts will fully and fair-
ly adjudicate federal claims.199 Proponents of Rooker-Feldman argue 
that state appellate courts “have a record equal to that of the federal 
courts in protecting constitutional rights.”200 Ultimately, when errors 
are made in either the state or federal court systems, discretionary 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court is available,201 even if it is rare in 
either case. 
 In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine advances the important in-
terests of separation of powers, federalism, and parity, and courts 
analyzing unanswered questions about the doctrine’s scope should 
reason from these underlying principles. Unfortunately, federal 
courts have not always made this inquiry. As Professor Susan 
Bandes notes, “Courts have too often used the jurisdictional stature 
of the doctrine as a convenient way to avoid reasoning through the 
policies underlying it.”202 As we shall see, nowhere is this more ap-
parent than the current split among federal circuit courts as to 
whether Rooker-Feldman protects state court interlocutory orders. 
                                                                                                                    
organs of the national judiciary should be one supreme court and as many subordinate 
courts as congress should think proper to appoint”). 
196. FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 325-26.  
197. See FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 160, at 402 (“[T]he infe-
rence seems to be conclusive that the state courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in 
all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was not expressly prohibited.”). In-
deed, the presumption that state courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims is fur-
ther supported by the fact that Congress did not grant statutory federal question jurisdic-
tion to the lower federal courts until 1875. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 828-29.  
198. See, e.g., Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of 
State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 238-39 (1999); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, 
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial 
Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214-15 (1983). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 184, 
at 273 (suggesting that “[a]lthough parity is an empirical question, no empirical answer 
seems possible”). 
199. See Schmucker, supra note 159, at 336; Smith, supra note 168, at 636. 
200. Chang, supra note 54, at 1366 (footnote omitted). 
201. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other 
grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006) (providing that the Supreme 
Court may review cases from the federal court of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (provid-
ing that the Supreme Court may review final state court judgments on federal claims). 
202. Bandes, supra note 16, at 1192. 
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IV.   CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER ROOKER-FELDMAN PROTECTS 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
 The circuits are split on whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
bars suits in lower federal courts that challenge state court interlocu-
tory orders.203 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use  
a narrow approach, applying Rooker-Feldman only to final state 
court judgments.204 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits use a broad approach, extending Rooker-Feldman to 
all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders.205 The First, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use an intermediate approach, ap-
plying Rooker-Feldman to some—but not all—state court interlocuto-
ry orders.206
A.   The Narrow Approach: Rooker-Feldman Does Not Extend to State 
Court Interlocutory Orders 
 The Fifth,207 Seventh,208 and Eleventh209 Circuits have held that 
Rooker-Feldman protects only final state court judgments.210 In these 
                                                                                                                    
203. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 21 (“Federal courts have been some-
what divided about whether Rooker-Feldman can bar lower federal-court jurisdiction when 
a state court has made an interlocutory ruling, such as granting a preliminary injunc-
tion.”); Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 144 (“[L]ower courts are strug-
gling to define the ‘end’ of state-court proceedings. . . . [and] have, understandably, reached 
a variety of inconsistent conclusions.” (citation omitted)). 
204. See infra Part IV.A. 
205. See infra Part IV.B. 
206. See infra Part IV.C. This Article intentionally does not classify the approach used 
by courts within the Third Circuit because application of Rooker-Feldman to state court in-
terlocutory orders has been inconsistent. Compare Warren v. Baker, No. 4:07-cv-188, 2007 
WL 2264099, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2007) (holding that Rooker-Feldman barred federal 
claim challenging a state court interlocutory ruling on a party’s preliminary objections), 
with RegScan, Inc. v. Brewer, No. Civ.A. 04-6043, 2005 WL 874662, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
13, 2005) (holding that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable after federal plaintiff argued that 
“Rooker-Feldman should not apply” to an “interlocutory and procedural” state court judgment).
207. See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (limiting Rooker-
Feldman to final state court judgments). But see, e.g., Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 
(5th Cir. 1986) (“We hold no warrant to review even final judgments of state courts, let 
alone those which may never take final effect because they remain subject to revision in 
the state appellate system.”). 
208. See, e.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); Brown 
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2:07-CV-221 PS, 2008 WL 711721, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar.  
13, 2008). 
209. See, e.g., Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 
(11th Cir. 2003) (providing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires a “prior state court 
ruling [that] was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits”); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 
234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (“No party has called to our attention any final judg-
ments in the Florida state courts upon which a Rooker-Feldman bar reasonably could  
be based . . . .”). 
210. Courts in other circuits occasionally have applied this narrow rule as well. See, 
e.g., H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that ab-
stention principles rather than Rooker-Feldman apply when there are ongoing state pro-
ceedings and no final state court judgment (citation omitted)); RegScan, 2005 WL 874662, 
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circuits, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent federal dis-
trict courts from exercising de facto appellate jurisdiction over state 
court interlocutory orders,211 nor does it protect state court judgments 
that are either subject to modification212 or appealable in state 
court.213 The Eleventh Circuit even requires a final state court judg-
ment on the merits before it will consider Rooker-Feldman.214
 Two rationales support this narrow approach. First, some argue 
that Rooker-Feldman should protect only those final state court 
judgments that are reviewable by the Supreme Court under 28 
U.S.C. § 1257.215 Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself arose 
from judicial interpretation of § 1257,216 “denying jurisdiction based 
on a state court judgment that is not eligible for review by the United 
States Supreme Court simply would not follow from the jurisdictional 
statute that invigorated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the first 
place.”217 Thus, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is only necessary to ef-
fectuate the negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257—it is needed 
only to prevent lower federal courts from considering cases that the 
                                                                                                                    
at *1-3 (refusing to apply Rooker-Feldman, despite a prior state court interlocutory order 
denying party’s motion to amend complaint). 
211. See, e.g., TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591 (stating that because Rooker-Feldman only ap-
plies after the state proceedings ended, “an interlocutory ruling does not evoke the doctrine 
or preclude federal jurisdiction”); Main St. Bank & Trust v. Saltonstall, No. 06-1114, 2006 
WL 2385274, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2006) (“[A]n interlocutory state court order does not 
evoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the state court proceedings are still pending.” 
(citing TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591)).  
212. See In re Hodges, 350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (stating that although 
state court had entered a judgment of foreclosure prior to the federal suit, Rooker-Feldman
did not preclude federal jurisdiction because the foreclosure judgment was modifiable by 
the trial court until the sale was confirmed). 
213. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The state case 
was on appeal to the Louisiana appellate court. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
is inapplicable.”); In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
Rooker-Feldman did not apply because “[t]wo higher courts within the state judiciary could 
hear appeals” of the state court judgment).  
214. The Eleventh Circuit applies Rooker-Feldman only if four conditions are met, in-
cluding the requirement that “the prior state court ruling was a final or conclusive judg-
ment on the merits.” Amos, 347 F.3d at 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003). Eleventh Circuit deci-
sions after Exxon Mobil continue to use the Amos test. See, e.g., Burt Dev. Co. v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 230 F. App’x 910, 912-13 (11th Cir. 2007); Morris v. Wroble, 206 F. App’x 915, 
918 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2006); Force v. Kolhage, 198 F. App’x 827, 829 (11th Cir. 2006); Hers-
kowitz v. Reid, 187 F. App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006); Ransom v. Georgia, 181 F. App’x 
776, 777 (11th Cir. 2006). 
215. See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d at 516. 
216. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (interpreting 28 
U.S.C. § 1257 (1976)); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923) (interpreting 
the statutory antecedent to § 1257); see also Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 
25, at 144 (“Rooker-Feldman is derived from an interpretation of § 1257, which reserves to 
the Supreme Court the right to review state-court judgments . . . .”). 
217. Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000), abrogated by Federación de 
Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 27-28 (1st  
Cir. 2005). 
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Supreme Court is permitted to hear under the statute.”218 The Fifth 
Circuit relies on this reasoning.219
 Second, courts cite language from Exxon Mobil for the proposition 
that Rooker-Feldman is limited to federal suits that are filed “after 
the state proceedings ended”220—in other words, federal suits chal-
lenging final state court judgments.221 As noted above, the Supreme 
Court stated in Exxon Mobil that the Rooker and Feldman cases 
demonstrate the rare circumstances in which the doctrine bars juris-
diction.222 The Court noted that “[i]n both cases, the losing party in 
state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings 
ended.”223 Although this language from Exxon Mobil is pure dictum,224
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits nonetheless give it binding effect and 
refuse to apply Rooker-Feldman unless state proceedings have 
ground to a complete halt.225
                                                                                                                    
218. Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (summa-
rizing appellant’s argument before rejecting it). 
219. See In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d at 516 (implying that the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine is inapplicable unless there is a “final state court judgment[]” under § 1257 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). The First Circuit also initially tied the scope of Rooker-
Feldman to appealability under § 1257. See Cruz, 204 F.3d at 21 n.5; Hill v. Town of Con-
way, 193 F.3d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1999). However, the First Circuit changed course after 
Exxon Mobil and stated that appealability under § 1257 was no longer necessary to trigger 
Rooker-Feldman. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 26-27.  
220. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). 
221. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006); TruServ Corp. v. 
Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d at 591 (7th Cir. 2005). 
222. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. 
223. Id. (emphasis added). 
224. As noted earlier in this Article, there were absolutely no state court interlocutory 
orders at issue in Exxon Mobil. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (“Arguing 
from these kinds of fine linguistic differences, in an opinion in which the Court was not fo-
cusing on the final-versus-interlocutory distinction, does not seem to us to be a fruitful ex-
ercise.”). Indeed, when the Court did hold that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable, it merely 
noted that ExxonMobil had filed its federal suit “well before any judgment in state court.” 
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added). 
225. See, e.g., Rowley, 200 F. App’x at 275 (“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court 
judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state 
proceedings [have] ended.’ ” (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291) (alteration in original)); 
TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591 (“The doctrine only applies to cases like Rooker and Feldman
where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings 
ended . . . .’ ” (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)).  
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B.   The Broad Approach: Rooker-Feldman Protects State Court 
Interlocutory Orders 
 The Second,226 Fourth,227 Sixth,228 and District of Columbia229 Cir-
cuits extend the protection of Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders 
and decisions by lower state courts.230 Courts within these circuits 
have applied this broad approach even after the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Exxon Mobil.231 As a result, Rooker-Feldman has been used 
to prevent federal collateral attacks on a variety of state court  
interlocutory orders, including stays,232 preliminary injunctions,233
preliminary orders,234 rulings on pretrial motions,235 and  
discovery orders.236
Several arguments support this broad approach. First, some 
courts reject the premise that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies 
                                                                                                                    
226. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir. 1997); Campbell v. 
Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996); Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 
1995); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other 
grounds 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
227. See Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003); Brown & 
Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000); Jordahl v. Democratic Party 
of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Martin v. Ball, Civil Action No. 5:06CV85, 
2008 WL 2120931, at *7 (N.D.W. Va. May 20, 2008) (applying an intermediate approach 
(citing Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 
17, 24 (1st Cir. 2005))). 
228. See Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003). 
229. See Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
230. Before Exxon Mobil, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits also held that 
Rooker-Feldman protected state court interlocutory orders and lower state court decisions. 
See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003); Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 
314 F.3d 468, 474-75 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogation recognized by Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 
F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006); Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 
1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990). These cir-
cuits abandoned the broad approach after Exxon Mobil. See supra Part IV.A and infra  
Part IV.C.
231. E.g., Vizgrand, Inc. v. Supervalue Holding, Inc., No. 07-13430-BC, 2007 WL 
2413102, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2007); Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Morrison, 496 F. 
Supp. 2d 678, 685 n.11 (E.D. Va. 2007); Hann v. Michigan, No. 05-CV-71347-DT, 2007 WL 
892413, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2007); Field Auto City, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 476 F. 
Supp. 2d 545, 553 (E.D. Va. 2007); Galtieri v. Kelly, 441 F. Supp. 2d 447, 458 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006); Sinclair v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 5:05-CV-072, 2005 WL 3434827, at *3 (W.D. 
Mich. Dec. 13, 2005). But see Phillips ex rel. Green v. City of New York, 453 F. Supp. 2d 
690, 714-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
232. E.g., Pieper, 336 F.3d at 459, 464-65 (order staying litigation pending arbitration); 
Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 319-20 (denial of motion to stay judicial proceedings). 
233. E.g., Kenmen, 314 F.3d at 473-75 (grant of temporary and permanent injunctions).  
234. E.g., Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1995) (sua sponte order disquali-
fying attorneys from representing clients due to ethical constraints). 
235. E.g., Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 2005) (denial of motion for re-
cusal); Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 319-20 (denial of motion to compel arbitration); Brown & Root, 
Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2000) (denial of motion to compel arbitration). 
236. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1990) (grant of motion to 
compel production of documents during discovery). 
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only when Supreme Court review is available under § 1257.237 For 
example, the Sixth Circuit reasons that “the statement that lower 
federal courts should not have jurisdiction where the Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine) does not logically imp-
ly that lower federal courts should always have jurisdiction when the 
Supreme Court does not.”238 If anything, “a natural reading of 28 
U.S.C. § 1257 suggests that no federal court (neither inferior nor Su-
preme) has jurisdiction over appeals from non-final state-court orders 
or from orders and decisions of lower state courts.”239
 Second, courts applying a broad rule note that Rooker-Feldman’s 
purpose is intertwined with principles of federalism,240 parity,241 and 
judicial economy.242 Under this rationale, the doctrine recognizes that 
“state courts are just as obligated and competent as federal courts to 
decide federal constitutional questions.”243 Additionally, courts reason 
that “a path is available through the state appellate system to the 
Supreme Court” under the existing federal structure.244 Finally, these 
courts emphasize that the doctrine avoids “waste of judicial resources 
and unnecessary friction between state and federal courts [that] 
might ensue if a federal district court intervened to overrule a state 
court decision.”245
C.   The Intermediate Approach: Rooker-Feldman Protects Some (but 
Not All) State Court Interlocutory Orders 
 The First,246 Eighth,247 Ninth,248 and Tenth249 Circuits follow an 
intermediate approach, extending Rooker-Feldman to some—but not 
                                                                                                                    
237. E.g., Pieper, 336 F.3d at 462; Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 
1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 
238. Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464; accord Doe & Assocs. Law Offices, 252 F.3d at 1030 
(“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not premised on the availability of Supreme Court re-
view of the state court decision.”). 
239. Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464 n.5 (emphasis added); see also 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469.1, at 146-47 (2d ed. 2002) (“Of course 
the prospect that there may never be Supreme Court jurisdiction may support the further 
conclusion that district court subject-matter jurisdiction is even less appropriate.”). 
240. See, e.g., Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th 
Cir. 1997)). 
241. See, e.g., Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds 481 
U.S. 1 (1987). 
242.  See, e.g., Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1142. 
243. Id. (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 
U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975)). 
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281,  
286 (1970)). 
246. See Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 
410 F.3d 17, 23-25 (1st Cir. 2005). 
247. See Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Federación
test). But see Friends of Eudora Pub. Sch. Dist. of Chicot County v. Beebe, No. 5:06CV0044 
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all—state court interlocutory orders. This approach has its origins in 
Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del 
Trabajo de Puerto Rico,250 a First Circuit case decided less than two 
months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil.251
 Federación involved a suit in federal district court challenging an 
interlocutory judgment by the Puerto Rico appellate courts.252 A labor 
union had filed an unfair labor practices grievance before the Puerto 
Rico Labor Relations Board against an employer.253 The employer 
moved to dismiss, contending that the Board lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the National Labor Relations Act preempted Puerto Rico labor 
law.254 After the Board denied the motion, the employer unsuccessful-
ly appealed the interlocutory order in the Puerto Rico courts.255 Un-
deterred, the employer filed suit in federal district court, seeking “an 
injunction ordering the Board to terminate its proceedings for lack of 
jurisdiction.”256 The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction un-
der the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.257 Although the employer argued 
that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to interlocutory orders,258 the 
First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.259
 In its analysis, the First Circuit started from the premise that 
“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final 
for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state pro-
ceedings [have] ended.’ ”260 Elaborating on the meaning of this dictum 
from Exxon Mobil, the court held that state proceedings have “ended” 
                                                                                                                    
SWW, 2008 WL 828360, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 25, 2008) (stating that Rooker-Feldman ap-
plies to interlocutory orders, without mentioning intermediate approach from Federación).
248. See Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2005) (applying Federación test). 
249. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying Fe-
deración test). But see Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The state con-
demnation proceeding need not be final in order to serve as grounds for Rooker-Feldman 
preclusion.” (citing Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 2002))); 
Stubblefield v. Egelhoff, No. 08-cv-00619-BNB, 2008 WL 2011865, at *2 (D. Colo. May 8, 
2008) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars review not only of final judgments entered by 
state courts, but also of their interlocutory orders.” (citing Brown & Root, Inc. v. Brecke-
nridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000))).
250. 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005).  
251. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 280 (2005) (de-
cided March 30, 2005); Federación, 410 F.3d at 17 (decided May 27, 2005). 
252. Federación, 410 F.3d at 19-20. 
253. Id. at 19.  
254. Id.
255. Id. at 19-20. 
256. Id. at 20.  
257. Federación de Maestros de P.R., Inc. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 
265 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188-89 (D.P.R. 2003). 
258. Federación, 410 F.3d at 20. 
259. Id. at 29. 
260. Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)). 
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under Rooker-Feldman in three situations.261 First, state proceedings 
have ended “when the highest state court in which review is availa-
ble has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be re-
solved.”262 In other words, Rooker-Feldman undoubtedly applies when 
there is a final state court judgment under § 1257.263 Second, state 
proceedings have ended “if the state action has reached a point where 
neither party seeks further action”264 For example, Rooker-Feldman
applies when the losing party does not timely appeal a lower state 
court judgment, even though the judgment may not be sufficiently fi-
nal to trigger Supreme Court review under § 1257.265 Third, state 
proceedings have ended when they “have finally resolved all the fed-
eral questions in the litigation, but state law or purely factual ques-
tions (whether great or small) remain to be litigated.”266 This third 
situation relies on Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.267 In Cox Broad-
casting, the Supreme Court outlined four situations in which nonfin-
al state court judgments are considered “final” for purposes of § 1257 
because all federal issues have been resolved.268 The First Circuit ap-
plied this test to the facts of Federación and held that Rooker-
                                                                                                                    
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 25. 
267. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
268. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 25-27 & n.11. Cox Broadcasting outlined four situa-
tions in which nonfinal state court judgments nonetheless qualify as “final” judgments for 
Supreme Court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006): 
 In the first category are those cases in which there are further proceedings—
even entire trials—yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or 
another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings 
preordained. . . . 
 Second, there are cases . . . in which the federal issue, finally decided by the 
highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the 
outcome of future state-court proceedings. . . .  
 In the third category are those situations where the federal claim has been 
finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to 
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever 
the ultimate outcome of the case. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Lastly, there are those situations where the federal issue has been finally de-
cided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party 
seeking review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus 
rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where re-
versal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further 
litigation on the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the na-
ture and character of, or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state 
proceedings still to come. . . . [And,] a refusal immediately to review the state-
court decision might seriously erode federal policy . . . . 
Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 479-83. 
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Feldman barred the employer’s federal suit because the Puerto Rico 
judgment fell within one of the Cox Broadcasting situations.269
 Two rationales support Federación’s intermediate approach. 
First, the First Circuit repeatedly emphasizes that a state court pro-
ceeding can “end” under Exxon Mobil even when the Supreme Court 
does not have appellate jurisdiction under § 1257.270 This echoes the 
rationale of circuits that use the broad approach.271 Second, the First 
Circuit gives binding effect to Exxon Mobil’s dictum that state pro-
ceedings must have “ended” for Rooker-Feldman to apply.272 This 
mirrors the rationale of those circuits that use the narrow ap-
proach.273 Federación resolves any tension between these two ratio-
nales by stating that “appealability under § 1257 is not necessary to 
satisfy the Exxon Mobil ‘ended’ test, [but] it will almost always be 
sufficient.”274 In other words, “if a state court decision is final enough 
that the Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over a direct appeal, 
then it is final enough that a lower federal court does not have juris-
diction over a collateral attack on that decision.”275
 In sum, the circuits are split on whether Rooker-Feldman bars 
federal suits challenging state court interlocutory orders. Circuits us-
ing the narrow approach apply Rooker-Feldman only to final state 
court judgments. Circuits using the broad approach extend the doc-
trine to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. Cir-
cuits using the intermediate approach apply Rooker-Feldman to 
some—but not all—state court interlocutory orders. 
                                                                                                                    
269. Federación, 410 F.3d at 28-29.  
270. See id. at 24 (holding that, under Federación’s second situation, a proceeding has 
“ended” under Exxon Mobil “if the state action has reached a point where neither party 
seeks further action,” even though it may not be an appealable final judgment under 
§ 1257); id. at 26 (“[W]e hasten to repeat that a proceeding may have ‘ended’ under Exxon 
Mobil even when § 1257 jurisdiction would not have been available.”). 
271. E.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe 
& Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 
272. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 24 (“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment 
is sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state proceed-
ings [have] ended.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic In-
dus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005))). 
273. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Exxon Mobil
tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’ ” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)); TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“The doctrine only applies to cases like Rooker and Feldman where ‘the los-
ing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended . . . .’ ” 
(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)). 
274. Federación, 410 F.3d at 26-27. 
275. Id. at 27. 
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V.   THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT ROOKER-FELDMAN 
PROTECTS STATE COURT INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
 When an appropriate case presents itself, the Supreme Court 
should resolve the split in circuit authority by holding that Rooker-
Feldman extends to all state court judgments, including interlocutory 
orders. Under this interpretation, the doctrine would prohibit federal 
district courts from exercising de facto appellate jurisdiction over 
state court preliminary injunctions, stays, rulings on pretrial mo-
tions, discovery orders, and other interlocutory decisions.276 The 
Court should adopt this broad approach because it is the only rule 
that is consistent with the fundamental purposes underlying the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. First, the broad approach requires lower 
federal courts to enforce separation of powers by staying within the 
boundaries of their limited statutory jurisdiction.277 Second, the broad 
approach advances principles of federalism by requiring litigants to 
seek appellate review of state court decisions in the state court sys-
tem.278 Third, the broad approach recognizes that state courts are ful-
ly competent to adjudicate federal claims.279
A.   Extending Rooker-Feldman to State Court Interlocutory Orders 
Ensures Separation of Powers by Keeping Lower Federal Courts 
Within Their Limited Jurisdictional Role 
 The most important reason why lower federal courts should not 
exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory 
orders is that Congress has not given explicit authority for such ju-
risdiction.280 The Constitution entrusts Congress with the exclusive 
power to set the jurisdictional boundaries of the lower federal 
                                                                                                                    
276. See supra Part IV.B. 
277. See infra Part V.A. 
278. See infra Part V.B. 
279. See infra Part V.C. 
280. See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“ ‘Congress has empowered the federal district courts to exercise only original jurisdic-
tion.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 
(4th Cir. 2000))); Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 464 n.5 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“[A] natural reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 suggests that no federal court (neither infe-
rior nor Supreme) has jurisdiction over appeals from non-final state-court orders.” (empha-
sis added)); Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335 (“Because Congress gave only the Supreme 
Court the explicit right to review the decisions of a state court, Congress meant to deny all 
other federal courts that power.”). 
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courts.281 As a result, “[f]ederal district courts have no power to hear 
a case unless expressly authorized to do so.”282
 The Supreme Court currently is the only federal court with the 
authority to exercise any jurisdiction over state court judgments.283
Congress has granted the Supreme Court limited jurisdiction over 
certain state court judgments—specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 
“[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State 
in which a decision could be had” that involve a federal question.284
Because this grant of jurisdiction is limited to the Supreme Court, 
lower federal courts “possess no power whatever to sit in direct review 
of state court decisions.”285
 This conclusion is further supported by Congress’ limited grant of 
“original” jurisdiction to federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. Professor Chang notes that “[a]s used in the statutes, the 
term ‘original’ jurisdiction is employed in direct contrast to ‘appellate’ 
jurisdiction.”286 Because Congress did not expressly grant appellate
jurisdiction to federal district courts, those courts simply lack juris-
diction to review state court decisions, regardless of whether the 
state court decisions are final judgments or interlocutory orders. 
 The narrow and intermediate approaches—which allow lower 
federal courts to review some or all state court interlocutory orders—
misinterpret these jurisdictional statutes and violate the constitu-
tional separation of powers. Both approaches mistakenly allow feder-
al district courts to exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over some 
or all state court interlocutory orders,287 even though Congress has 
granted no such jurisdiction.288 The narrow approach’s error is 
rooted in its overly restrictive interpretation of Rooker-Feldman, un-
                                                                                                                    
281. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Atl. Coast Line 
R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 285 (1970); Bandes, supra note 16, at 
1189; Chang, supra note 54, at 1376. 
282. Funkhouser et al., supra note 157, at 774; accord Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 
(“The federal district courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction 
which Congress determines is appropriate.”). 
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). There are only a few circumstances in which Con-
gress has expressly conveyed jurisdiction upon lower federal courts to review state court 
judgments. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548, 549, 727, 1129, 1141, 1325, 1328 (2006) 
(federal bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to avoid, modify, and discharge certain state 
court judgments); 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006) (federal district courts have jurisdiction to re-
view Indian child custody proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (federal district courts 
have jurisdiction over state prisoners’ habeas corpus petitions in certain circumstances). 
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 
285. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added). 
286. Chang, supra note 54, at 1346. 
287. See, e.g., Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006); Dornheim v. 
Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2005); TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 
591 (7th Cir. 2005); Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 
(11th Cir. 2003).  
288. See Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286; Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335. 
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der which the doctrine protects only “final” state court judgments 
that are reviewable by the Supreme Court under § 1257.289 In other 
words, courts using the narrow approach presume that federal dis-
trict courts have jurisdiction over suits challenging state court judg-
ments unless the judgment qualifies for Supreme Court review. 
 This assumption is irrational because it implies that “the Su-
preme Court’s lack of jurisdiction essentially ‘creates’ jurisdiction for 
the lower federal courts.”290 Under well-established principles, lower 
federal courts cannot hear a case unless Congress affirmatively
grants jurisdiction by statute.291 The idea that federal district courts 
somehow automatically have jurisdiction over cases that the Su-
preme Court cannot hear turns this principle on its head.292 If any-
thing, the absence of Supreme Court jurisdiction over most state 
court interlocutory orders means that federal district court jurisdic-
tion is “even less appropriate.”293
 Although the intermediate approach recognizes this flaw in the 
narrow approach, it nonetheless errs by falling prey to the seductive 
song of Exxon Mobil’s dictum. In Federación, the First Circuit held 
that Rooker-Feldman bars federal district courts from reviewing 
some state court judgments that are not appealable under § 1257.294
However, the Federación Court erred by assuming that Exxon Mobil
restricts the doctrine to cases in which “ ‘the state proceedings [have] 
ended.’ ”295 Reliance on this dictum led the First Circuit astray. Un-
der Federación’s intermediate approach, federal district courts can 
exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory 
orders, except in those rare situations when the state action grinds to 
                                                                                                                    
289. See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992). 
290. Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 2003). 
291. Funkhouser et al., supra note 157, at 774; see also Keene Corp. v. United States, 
508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850). 
292. See Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464 (noting that a congressional grant of exclusive juris-
diction to the Supreme Court “does not logically imply that lower federal courts should al-
ways have jurisdiction when the Supreme Court does not”).  
293. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 239, § 4469.1, at 146-47; accord Pieper, 336 F.3d at 
463 (“The Supreme Court’s lack of jurisdiction . . . seems . . . actually to be a stronger ar-
gument against lower federal-court jurisdiction than in favor of it.”). 
294. See Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 
410 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that “a proceeding may have ‘ended’ under Exxon 
Mobil even when § 1257 jurisdiction would not have been available”); id. at 26-27 (stating 
that “appealability under § 1257 is not necessary to satisfy the Exxon Mobil ‘ended’ test, 
[but] it will almost always be sufficient”). 
295. Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)); see also Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th 
Cir. 2006); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2005). As noted above, this language from Exxon Mobil is pure dictum. See supra Part II.E. 
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a complete halt or the state judgment is sufficiently “final” to qualify 
for Supreme Court review under § 1257.296
 This intermediate approach is nothing more than old wine in new 
bottles. Federación offers a more nuanced analysis,297 but its effect is 
virtually the same as the narrow approach—the vast majority of 
state court interlocutory orders are subject to appellate review in fed-
eral district court, even though Congress has not granted such juris-
diction. Instead of reasoning from established jurisdictional prin-
ciples—under which Congress alone has the power to define the ju-
risdiction of the lower federal courts298—the intermediate approach 
offers a convoluted analysis, based on Supreme Court dictum, which 
ultimately allows federal district courts to stray outside of the enu-
merated statutory authority authorized by Congress. 
 The bottom line is that, subject to a few exceptions, Congress has 
not granted federal court appellate jurisdiction over state court inter-
locutory orders.299 The broad approach—which uses Rooker-Feldman
to prohibit federal district courts from reviewing both final and  
interlocutory state court judgments—is the only rule that enforces 
separation of powers by ensuring that courts stay within their juris-
dictional boundaries. 
B.   Applying Rooker-Feldman to State Court Interlocutory Orders 
Advances Principles of Federalism 
 Extending Rooker-Feldman to state court interlocutory orders 
preserves the delicate balance of judicial federalism.300 Preventing 
federal district courts from reviewing all state court judgments meet-
                                                                                                                    
296. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 24-27. As explained above in Part IV.C, the First Cir-
cuit outlined three situations in which state proceedings have “ended” for purposes of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) the highest state court has rendered a final judgment that 
qualifies for Supreme Court review under § 1257; (2) neither party seeks further action in 
state court; or (3) the state judgment qualifies for Supreme Court review under § 1257 
through one of the Cox Broadcasting situations. See id.; see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 
420 U.S. 469, 479-83 (1975).  
297. For example, Federación correctly recognizes that § 1257 allows Supreme Court 
review of some technically nonfinal state court judgments. See 410 F.3d at 24-27 (citing the 
Supreme Court’s analysis from Cox Broadcasting).
298. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189 (“Congress has the responsibility for determin-
ing the precise contours of federal jurisdiction . . . .”); Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 (“The 
federal district courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction which 
Congress determines is appropriate.” (citation omitted)); see also Keene Corp. v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850). 
299. The exceptions include Supreme Court review of nonfinal state court judgments 
that qualify under Cox Broadcasting and federal district court review of state court judg-
ments in the limited contexts of bankruptcy, habeas corpus, and Indian child custody pro-
ceedings. See supra note 283. 
300. See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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ing the Exxon Mobil criteria301 is the only way to ensure that judicial 
review occurs separately in our two sovereign and independent court 
systems, with ultimate review in the U.S. Supreme Court.302 Entry of 
judgment by a state court—including issuance of an interlocutory  
order—constitutes an exercise of sovereign power. A federal lawsuit 
challenging a state court interlocutory order is just as much of an 
“end run” around the state court system as a suit challenging a  
final state court judgment.303 Both equally undermine the concept  
of federalism. 
 Extending Rooker-Feldman to state court interlocutory orders al-
so avoids antagonism between the state and federal systems.304 The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that our dual judicial system would 
cease to function “if state and federal courts were free to fight each 
other for control of a particular case.”305 This harmful tension be-
tween state and federal courts is inevitable if federal district courts 
can exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court prelimi-
nary injunctions, stays, rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders, 
and other interlocutory decisions. 
 For these reasons, the Supreme Court should reject the narrow306
and intermediate307 approaches used by several circuits. The narrow 
                                                                                                                    
301. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (hold-
ing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to “cases [1] brought by state-court losers 
[2] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district 
court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of  
those judgments”). 
302. See, e.g., Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . preserves a 
fundamental tenet in our system of federalism that . . . appellate review of state court deci-
sions occurs first within the state appellate system and then in the United States Supreme 
Court.” (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997))); Port Auth. Police Bene-
volent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“[D]ismissal of the complaint [challenging a state court preliminary injunction] was ap-
propriate under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which instructs us that the only courts em-
powered to review for constitutional error the New York trial court’s preliminary injunc-
tion are the appellate New York courts and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”).  
303. See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]iling suit with the 
district court [after an intermediate state-court interlocutory order] was the type of end 
run around an adverse state court ruling that we have explicitly rejected.” (citing Maple 
Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1999))); see also Brown & Root, Inc. v. 
Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]he independence of state 
courts would surely be compromised” if state court interlocutory orders “merely rang the 
opening bell for federal litigation of the same issues”). 
304. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds
481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
305. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). 
 306. See supra Part IV.A; see also TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (using narrow approach in which “an interlocutory ruling does not evoke the 
[Rooker-Feldman] doctrine”). 
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approach, under which Rooker-Feldman protects only final state 
court judgments, ignores concerns relating to federalism.308 The in-
termediate approach, under which the doctrine protects some state 
court interlocutory orders, does not go far enough.309 The broad ap-
proach is the only rule that preserves the essential attributes of judi-
cial federalism by protecting final and interlocutory state court 
judgments from collateral attack in federal courts. 
C.   Extending Rooker-Feldman to Interlocutory Orders Recognizes 
the Competence of State Courts on Federal Issues 
 The broad approach also is the only rule consistent with the con-
cept of parity between state and federal courts.310 Although scholars 
debate whether state courts underenforce federal rights,311 the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly emphasized that state courts are compe-
tent to decide federal claims.312 The concept of parity underlies the 
entire Rooker-Feldman doctrine—by prohibiting federal district 
courts from reviewing state court judgments, the doctrine assumes 
that state courts will fully and fairly adjudicate federal claims.313
 In light of this rationale, Rooker-Feldman should bar federal dis-
trict courts from reviewing state court decisions, regardless of wheth-
er those decisions are final judgments or interlocutory orders. If state 
courts are competent to issue final judgments in cases involving fed-
eral claims, it defies logic to suggest that they are somehow not com-
                                                                                                                    
 307. See Part IV.C; see also Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del 
Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23-25 (1st Cir. 2005) (using intermediate approach in which 
some, but not all, interlocutory orders trigger Rooker-Feldman). 
308. As noted above, the narrow approach has two rationales, neither of which involve 
principles of federalism. First, courts assume that Rooker-Feldman “is only necessary to ef-
fectuate the negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257—it is needed only to prevent lower 
federal courts from considering cases that the Supreme Court is permitted to hear under 
the statute.” Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (sum-
marizing argument for narrow interpretation). Second, courts mistakenly treat the “state 
proceedings ended” dicta in Exxon Mobil as binding. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. 
App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006); TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591. 
309. Like the narrow approach, the failing of the intermediate approach stems from its 
mistaken treatment of the Exxon Mobil “state proceedings ended” dicta as binding lan-
guage. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 24. 
310. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based in part on the rule that “state courts 
are as competent as federal courts to decide federal constitutional issues” (citing Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975))). 
311. E.g., compare Neuborne, supra note 190, at 1121-28 (arguing that federal courts 
are more sympathetic to federal claims than state courts), with William B. Rubenstein, The 
Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599-600 (1999) (arguing that state courts 
offer institutional advantages for protecting federal rights). 
312. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988); Deakins v. 
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976).  
313. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983); Schmucker, 
supra note 159, at 336; Smith, supra note 168, at 636; see also supra Part III.C. 
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petent to issue interlocutory orders in those same cases. The broad 
approach is the only rule that makes sense because it treats state 
court decisions in a uniform manner. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
 Courts have mangled the Rooker-Feldman doctrine since its in-
ception. Given this tradition of confusion, it is perhaps not surprising 
that circuits currently disagree on whether Rooker-Feldman protects 
state court interlocutory orders. 
 This Article ends with a bold proposition: this particular facet of 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not as complicated as it first appears. 
A state court judgment is an exercise of sovereign power, regardless 
of whether it is final or interlocutory in nature. The premise of our 
federal system is the notion that both state courts and federal courts 
are competent to adjudicate federal claims. The Constitution allows 
federal courts to review state court judgments only if Congress has 
expressly conveyed jurisdiction to do so. Under existing statutes, the 
only federal court with appellate jurisdiction over state court judg-
ments is the Supreme Court, which can (and occasionally does) cor-
rect errors that occur in both state and federal courts. 
 The bottom line is that Congress has not granted lower federal 
courts jurisdiction to review state court judgments. As long as Rook-
er-Feldman guarantees that federal courts respect the true meaning 
of this congressional silence, it is more than worthy of its place 
among jurisdictional doctrines.
